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Abstract 
This paper employs firm-level panel data of 57 incumbent and entrant firms for 23 
European countries in the decade from 2003 to 2012. We examine the impact of 
service- and facility-based competition on firm-level investment as well as the strategic 
effects underlying infrastructure investment decisions. At the same time we explicitly 
model the structural dynamics of broadband investment by means of a flexible 
accelerator model. The empirical specification employs dynamic panel estimation 
techniques which allows us to account for various sources of endogeneity. We find that 
facility-based competition exerts a positive and significant impact on both incumbents 
and entrants implying that incumbents’ and entrants’ investment decisions are strategic 
complements. Moreover, we find that intermodal competition in terms of fixed-mobile 
substitution exerts different effects at the firm level. Finally, we show that service-based 
competition appears to have no significant impact on the investment decision of 
incumbents and entrants. However, with respect to the later phase of market 
liberalization, service-based competition exerts a negative impact on entrants’ 
investment. Our results thus also provide relevant policy guidance on the role of 
service-based competition in regulating emerging high-speed broadband infrastructure. 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the liberalization of electronic communications markets in 1997/1998, the 
European Commission (EC) issued several guidelines to introduce competition in those 
markets by means of mandated wholesale access obligations. Typically, these 
obligations were asymmetrically imposed on formerly state-owned “incumbent” 
operators who were deemed to have significant market power related to the possession 
of monopoly-like legacy infrastructure. In particular, the EC in its Directive 2887/2000 
has foreseen mandated wholesale access to the local loop (European Parliament & 
Council, 2000) and thus enabled new market operators (“entrants”) to offer retail 
narrowband voice and broadband services directly to customers. Service-based 
competition that hinges directly upon a set of pre-defined access regulations and cost-
oriented wholesale access charges, in particular, allows the entrant to offer competitive 
retail services without getting engaged in timely, costly, and risky roll-out of own access 
network infrastructure, if access obligations are effectively implemented by the national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs). In the early stages of market liberalization service-based 
competition massively increased price competition and thus had an immediate and 
positive welfare effect in terms of static efficiency. 
The EC also emphasized in its Directive 2002/19/EC that mandated access 
should not reduce the incentives of entrants to invest in alternative infrastructure 
(European Parliament & Council, 2002). The latter, in turn, would be essential to foster 
competition in the long-run in terms of dynamic efficiency. Moreover, infrastructure- (or: 
facility-) based competition involves a much lower degree of industry micro-
management and hence lower administrative costs. However, the EC has never 
explicitly mandated the entrant to start investing in its own access network after a 
certain period of time, with a formal requirement to enter facility-based competition. 
Consequently, the decision to invest in own facilities is up to the entrant contingent, inter 
alia, on regulatory investment conditions. As a result, wireline communications markets 
are still characterized by two different types of entrants, those who remain service-
based competitors, and those who gradually self-deploy network infrastructure and thus 
also enter facility-based competition becoming at least partly independent network 
[1] 
operators. The latter development adheres to the so-called “ladder of investment” (LoI) 
hypothesis (Cave & Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006). According to this hypothesis, 
regulatory-induced service-based competition serves as a stepping stone for entrants to 
engage progressively in backward integration and ultimately to self-deploy access 
infrastructure.1 The former, however, still represents by far the predominant group of 
entrants.2  
One of the most controversial questions is which mode of competition is 
preferable in order to lower prices and to achieve high investment at the same time. 
This issue becomes even more important in view of the deployment of fiber-based next 
(or second) generation communications infrastructure; in particular, it is hotly debated 
whether emerging communications infrastructure should be subjected to a similar set of 
sector-specific access regulations and whether service-based competition is essential, 
in a similar way as in the beginning of liberalization of first-generation broadband 
networks, or if it rather diminishes ex ante investment incentives.3 Infrastructure-based 
operators argue that service-based competition via mandatory access regulations 
restricts their ability to generate sufficient revenues and would thus be detrimental to ex 
ante investment incentives and network innovations. Conversely, for NRAs and service-
based entrants a potential threat of new and possibly more intense monopoly areas 
arises in the course of the deployment of new fiber-based infrastructure, which entails 
the need to have again an appropriate access regulation in place. 
Utilizing the experience of a decade of regulating first-generation broadband 
networks, our paper intends to draw lessons from the impact of both modes of 
competition on investment in fixed broadband markets. In addition, we examine the 
impact of wireless (“intermodal”) competition from mobile networks on investment 
1 Hence in the U.S. the LoI hypothesis is known as the “stepping stone” hypothesis. 
2 In principle, there might be a continuum between pure service-based competition and facility-based 
competition (Guthrie, 2006). However, in broadband/telecommunications markets one has basically 
observed the following categories of operators during the entire period of market liberalization: i) 
incumbent firms that were subject to sector-specific and asymmetric ex ante regulations imposed on 
legacy infrastructure, and, ii) entrant firms either with own access infrastructure, such as cable TV 
networks (“infrastructure or facility-based operators”) or without (“service-based operators” relying on 
wholesale access obligations). 
3 The reader is referred to Telecommunications Policy special issue published in 2013 (Volume 37(10)) 
which collects controversial papers on the topic “Regulatory approaches and investment in new 
communications infrastructure”. 
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activities of fixed broadband operators. In answering this, we employ an unbalanced 
panel data set of 57 operators from 23 European Union (EU) member states for the 
years from 2003 to 2012. The period of analysis thus covers the beginning of service-
based competition in broadband markets up to the early phase of transition to next 
generation infrastructure deployment that has been initiated only a few years ago in 
most EU member states. We therefore exploit information over a whole decade of 
market liberalization and regulation involving all relevant sources of competition in order 
to have a sound basis to derive reliable recommendations for future (de-)regulatory 
policies to be imposed on new communications infrastructure. 
Our empirical specification incorporates: i) generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) and bias-corrected fixed effects estimators to account for the endogeneity bias 
due to the dynamic specification of the investment equation, omitted variables and 
reverse causality patterns; ii) strategic firm-level effects regarding investment decisions, 
and finally, iii) the structural dynamics of adjustment costs in terms of a dynamic 
investment accelerator model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related 
and recent empirical literature. Section 3 outlines our basic hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the data set underlying our empirical investigation. Section 5 presents the 
empirical baseline specification and our identification strategy. Section 6 describes and 
interprets the main results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 summarizes and 
compiles important assessments for future regulatory policies. 
2. Empirical evidence 
In this section we review the most related and recent contributions from the empirical 
literature. In doing this, we build on the well-cited survey by Cambini and Jiang (2009) 
who review the older literature on investment and regulation. The authors conclude that 
the majority of the contributions find that service-based competition in terms of different 
forms of cost-based access regulations discouraged both incumbents and entrants from 
investing in fixed networks. In the following we also consider empirical studies that 
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employ measures of broadband penetration which is output-related and hence might 
provide a better proxy for consumer welfare. 
Bouckaert et al. (2010) examine the determinants of broadband penetration 
based on data for 20 OECD countries for the years from 2003 to 2008. The authors find 
that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on broadband penetration, 
whereas service-based competition is an impediment to penetration. The authors argue 
that their findings suggest that the LoI hypothesis does not provide sufficient justification 
for imposing comprehensive broadband access regulations. Grajek and Röller (2011) 
empirically estimate the relationship between regulation and investment as regards 
telecommunications investment of incumbent and entrant operators using data for EU 
member states for the years from 1997 to 2006. Using a formal regulatory index the 
authors find that access regulation reduces both individual firm and total industry 
investment. Moreover, the authors find that incumbents invest more in response to 
investment increases of entrants indicating that investments are strategic complements, 
although the complementarity is not significant the other way around, i.e. from the 
incumbents to entrants. Bacache et al. (2014) examine the incentives embedded in the 
EU regulatory framework on migration from old to new fiber-based access 
infrastructures using data from 15 EU member states for 17 semesters over the period 
from July 2002 to July 2010. The authors relate the number of access lines based on 
new access technologies to the number of unbundling and bitstream lines. Whereas the 
authors find some support for the LoI hypothesis for the migration from bitstream access 
to local loop unbundling at the lower rungs of the ladder with lower investment 
requirements, there is no empirical support for the hypothesis that mandatory local loop 
unbundling fosters entrants to invest in new and much more cost intensive access 
infrastructures. Nardotto et al. (2015) find similar results using broadband penetration 
data from December 2005 to December 2009 for the whole of the UK. The authors find 
support for a short ladder leading from resale to bitstream access and unbundling but 
not to self-deployed entrants’ access infrastructure. Crandall et al. (2013) is a recent 
OECD based study that utilizes country level data for the years from 2001 to 2010. The 
authors find that unbundling obligations have almost no significant impact on broadband 
penetration in the short run but a significantly negative impact on penetration in the long 
[4] 
run. Finally, Briglauer et al. (2013) are the first to investigate the determinants of fiber-
based infrastructure deployment using data for the years from 2005 to 2011. Their 
empirical specification incorporates real investment data for the EU27 states. The 
authors find that the more effective wholesale broadband access regulation and hence 
service-based competition is, the more negative is the impact on fiber deployment. 
Intermodal competition from mobile networks exerts a non-linear impact on aggregate 
investment in terms of an inverted U-shape relationship. 
Summarizing, the recent empirical analysis on wholesale access regulations and 
investment seems to prove the results in Cambini and Jiang (2009), according to which 
service-based competition and related broadband access regulations tend to be either 
statistically unrelated or negatively related to investment incentives. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that infrastructure-based competition exerts a positive impact on investment 
at the aggregate level. To the best of the authors´ knowledge, there is no empirical work 
that employs firm-level investment data, incorporates the structural dynamics of 
broadband investment and simultaneously takes into account both modes of 
competition as well as the relevant sources of endogeneity. This paper intends to fill this 
gap and identify the causal effects of service-based and facility-based competition on 
broadband investment during the relevant period of broadband market liberalization and 
regulation. 
3. Hypotheses 
This section identifies the main determinants of broadband investments in Europe in the 
decade from 2003 to 2012 and sets out corresponding hypotheses, which are aligned to 
the main modes of competition in broadband markets: Service-based competition 
(Section 3.1) and facility-based competition (Section 3.3). Moreover, we explicitly outline 
the dynamics of broadband investment in terms of a flexible accelerator investment 
model (Section 3.4). 
  
[5] 
3.2. Service-based competition 
At the beginning of market liberalization, EU member states introduced asymmetric 
(one-way) access regulations imposed on the incumbent operators, which enabled 
service-based competition at cost-oriented access charges directly set by NRAs. The 
EU regulatory framework basically provides three different kinds of wholesale access 
obligations, namely: i) “resale”, ii) “bitstream”, and iii) “unbundling”. Simple resale means 
that the entrant sells the services of the incumbent with no technical scope of product 
differentiation. In this case the entrant is hardly confronted with fixed and sunk costs. In 
the case of bitstream, the entrant has to build its own backbone network, which enables 
him to differentiate the quality characteristics of its retail services to some extent. In the 
case of unbundling, the entrant operates much more independently, since it gets 
physical access to the incumbent’s local loop copper lines.  
In view of these multi-level wholesale access remedies, the LoI hypothesis has 
been considered as a guiding principle in the EU regulatory framework tool to promote 
both price competition and broadband investment (ERG, 2005) and hence to resolve 
the classical trade-off between dynamic and static efficiency. An entrant that gradually 
invests moving from rung to rung (from simple resale to bitstream and then to 
unbundling and finally to self-deployed infrastructure) adds value to its services and 
operates more and more independently; service-based entrants will first acquire more 
information and establish a customer base, and therefore they will be ultimately able to 
invest in their own infrastructure, which then results in facility-based competition 
representing the top of the ladder (Briglauer & Gugler, 2013). Ideally, facility-based and 
service-based competition result in lower retail prices and increased product variety, 
which may also lead to an increase in total demand for broadband services. This 
demand increasing effect might also increase investment incentives by incumbents 
(Foros, 2004; Kotakorpi, 2006). Moreover, in the case of excessive capacities, when 
more downstream competition decreases retail prices, which in turn may be associated 
with an increase in total demand, it could be the case that the regulated incumbent is 
almost one-to-one compensated for foregone monopoly profits. From this point of view, 
rather than being substitute competition modes, service- and facility-based competition 
[6] 
would complement each other and there would be no inter-temporal trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency. 
However, several other effects predict that more intense service-based 
competition deteriorates investment incentives of incumbent and/or entrant operators: 
first, the incumbent will only be able to make monopoly profits until asymmetric access 
regulation is introduced which enables market entrance at cost-oriented access 
charges. This is because rents earned from wholesale access at cost-oriented prices 
are lower than monopoly rents from selling infrastructure directly to retail customers. 
This effect gets reinforced in case risks are shifted from entrants to incumbents, which 
is typically the case under standard cost-based access regimes (Pindyck 2007; Valletti 
2003). Guthrie (2006) and Bourreau and Dogan (2006) emphasize that the ex ante 
regulated incumbent is exposed to a considerable risk, while the entrant has investment 
flexibility in terms of exploiting new technologies. Innovations, such as xDSL 
technologies, enable the entrant to offer new products or higher quality services without 
facing the risk due to demand uncertainties. Thus, open access policies enable service-
based entrants to avoid investment in unsuccessful technologies after getting sufficient 
information from the market. Guthrie (2006) criticizes that regulatory access obligations 
typically do not incorporate the option value of “wait and see strategies” that service-
based entrants obtain. Overall, favourable access regulations constitute substantial 
opportunity costs for entrants’ investment and may thus postpone or hinder their 
infrastructure investment.  
Summarizing, service-based competition exerts a positive impact on entrants’ 
investment incentives only if multilayer access induces further investment activities and 
dominates entrants’ opportunity costs (representing the benefit from cheap access). 
With respect to the investment incentives of the incumbent the net effect is 
indeterminate to the extent that service-based competition simultaneously captures 
negative investment incentives related to (standard cost-based) access regulations, as 
well as the demand expanding effect according to which total revenues increase with 
the level of service-based competition. 
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3.3. Facility-based competition 
In this section we add another dimension of competition stemming from alternative 
wireline broadband operators, namely the entrant’s own self-deployed access lines, 
which represent facility-based competition that does not depend on any kind of 
asymmetric wholesale access regulations. The entrant by investing in facility-based 
access infrastructure enjoys additional benefits referring to entrepreneurial 
independency or better quality of service and it avoids paying the access charge to the 
incumbent. In reality, however, besides incumbents only operators with access to 
infrastructure elements prior to market liberalization substantially invested in deploying 
access networks. Most notably, these networks refer to coax-cable broadband 
infrastructure with prior cable TV networks or municipal utilities with prior duct 
infrastructure. In turn, service-based competition did not induce any substantial self-
deployed access infrastructure on the side of pure service-based entrants as evidenced 
in the empirical literature (Bacache et al. (2014); Boukaert et al. (2010); Nardotto et al. 
(2015)). According to Vogelsang (2013, p. 212) this can be interpreted as the “natural 
outcome of the economics of fixed broadband access”. Bender and Goetz (2011) 
provide a theoretical explanation why entrants ultimately refrain from self-deploying 
access infrastructure. The authors model competition between the incumbent and an 
entrant who faces a make-or-buy decision as regards the upstream level. The authors 
argue that service-based entrants have, in principle, an incentive to invest in view of 
possible cost savings but are also confronted with a strategic effect: lower costs enable 
lower retail prices, however, these might imply aggressive pricing and investment 
reactions from the incumbent in order to limit consumer migration to the entrants’ retail 
services.  
Wireline facility-based competition stemming from entrant operators hereinafter 
refers to access networks of cable operators complemented by some municipal 
investment activities which is distinctively different from activities of service-based 
entrants relying on access regulations. Regarding the relationship between facility-
based competition and investment, there is no clear prediction at the micro-level as 
shown in Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) in general. Rather, the relationship depends on 
the definition of competitive intensity and the oligopoly framework and consequently 
[8] 
investments can be increasing or decreasing functions of competition. However, it is 
well-known from the pre-emption literature that a potential infrastructure provider has an 
incentive to pre-empt another infrastructure provider by being the first and thus reducing 
the rivals’ profitability and incentives to invest. As a consequence, infrastructure 
providers might get engaged in a race to invest first and earn the rents if there is a first-
mover advantage. Such a pre-emption race is of particular relevance for investment 
upgrades in telecommunications (Gans, 2001; Guthrie, 2006; Vareda & Hoernig, 2010; 
Grajek & Röller, 2011) where infrastructure duplication is only possible in areas with 
high population density whereas in all other areas – due to the economics of fixed 
broadband access – infrastructure investment is only profitable, if at all, for one 
operator. This opens up the potential for a long-lasting first-mover advantage which thus 
fosters ex ante investment incentives. In addition, as shown in Bourreau et al. (2012, p. 
719), in case entrant operators benefit from sufficiently large investment spillovers, 
investment decisions become strategic complements. The authors argue that entrants 
total investment costs may be lower in areas where the incumbent operator has already 
incurred substantial administrative and contractual costs. Finally, Hori and Mizuno 
(2006) show that an incentive for pre-emption exists in an open access regulatory 
framework with uncertain demand. Again, both features appear to be characteristic for 
deployment of broadband infrastructure. 
Summarizing, incumbents’ and entrants’ infrastructure investment decisions 
mutually reinforce each other, i.e. investment decisions are strategic complements, if i) 
the operators engage in pre-emption strategies and “race” for the first-mover advantage 
in terms of aggressive price competition at the retail level and infrastructure investment, 
ii) investment spillover effects are sufficiently large or iii) if operators are subject to an 
open access framework with sufficiently high access charges and uncertain demand. As 
regards the role of facility-based competition from (intermodal) mobile networks there is 
no clear prediction concerning the functional relationship and the net impact on firm-
level investment. 
[9] 
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3.4. Investment dynamics: a flexible accelerator model 
Below we present a flexible accelerator investment model using a neoclassical 
production function with constant returns to scale and no substitution between input 
factors. Thus, it only takes into account quantity variables, while price variables are not 
included (Chirinko, 1993). The first derivative and cross partials of the production 
function are positive and the second derivatives are negative. This implies that the 
marginal products are positive at decreasing rates and are positively related to other 
input factors employed. Thus, increasing the output level would require an increase in 
inputs, following the objective of cost minimization and depending on the adjustment 
cost (Eisner, 1978). 
The main and most important assumption of this model is about the firm’s 
desired level of capital expressed in terms of a fixed capital to output ratio. We denote 
the desired level of capital of the firm 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡 by 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ , the output level by 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and the 
capital to output ratio by 𝛼𝛼. Based on the notion of optimal capital accumulation, the 
optimal level of capital is proportionally related to the level of output: 
(1) 11 −− = titi YK ,*, α  
where 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ and  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  represent the desired level of capital and the output level of the 
firm i  in the previous period of time 𝑡𝑡 − 1, respectively. Consequently, a high capital to 
output ratio is associated with high investment expenditures, and vice versa. In the 
simple accelerator investment model 𝛼𝛼 is constant. If the adjustment is immediate and 
ignoring depreciation, investment would be simply the difference in the desired capital 
stocks in period 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 − 1: 
(2)  
where  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  represents current investment in period 𝑡𝑡 for firm 𝑖𝑖. However, the older 
literature (Eisner, 1978) as well as recent and telecommunications related evidence 
(Briglauer et al., 2013; Grajek & Röller, 2011) suggest that it is unlikely that firms fully 
adjust their capital stock due to a change in the output level in the current period of time 
(in our case, within one year). Accelerator investment models where changes in the 
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level of capital require longer time to move toward a new equilibrium implied by a 
change in the level of output are referred to as flexible accelerator investment models. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that changes in the capital stock from year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡𝑡 
follow an adjustment process by a proportion 1 − 𝜆𝜆 of the difference between the actual 
and desired level of capital: 
(3)  
Next, we introduce replacement investment, i.e. the rate of the capital depreciation, in 
the flexible accelerator mechanism. As a result, the capital stock is expressed as the 
sum of the previous capital stock and the level of current investment minus the 
depreciation of the previous level of the capital stock (Jorgenson & Siebert, 1968): 
(4)  
where 𝛿𝛿 represents the constant rate of depreciation. From equation (4) we solve 
for 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and obtain: 
(5)  
From the flexible accelerator mechanism in equation (3) we now solve for 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 
obtain: 
(6) 11 −
∗ +−= tititi KKK ,,, )( λλ  
To complete the flexible accelerator investment model we insert equation (6) into 
equation (5) and obtain: 
(7)  
[11] 
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Finally, we integrate the capital to output ratio and the investment dynamics as captured 
by the lagged dependent variable to obtain the dynamic flexible accelerator investment 
model:4 
(8)   
Summarizing, if broadband investment is subject to a partial adjustment process, we 
expect that the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable, 𝜆𝜆, lies in the 
interval [0; 1] where the lower limit indicates that adjustment takes place 
instantaneously and the upper limit indicates complete persistence, i.e. there is no 
convergence towards an optimal desired long-run broadband infrastructure stock. 
Furthermore, with 𝛼𝛼 >  0 and 0 <  𝛿𝛿 < 1 we expect that the coefficient estimate of the 
(lagged) output variable is positive (negative). 
4. Data and variables 
Our data set covers 23 EU member states and 57 firms, including 21 incumbents and 
36 entrants for the years from 2003 to 2012. Our panel data set is unbalanced, since 
data availability regarding the start and end of the time period varies by firms and 
countries. We use the following main data sources: EU progress reports provide country 
level data on total broadband lines, i.e. regulated wholesale lines, entrants’ own lines 
and incumbents´ own lines; Worldscope provides firm-level data regarding capital 
expenditures (CAPEX), tangible fixed assets, sales and cash flow. Our sample 
comprises 57 different firms5 which vary widely in their size.6 Hence, we divide CAPEX, 
sales and cash flows by the one period-lagged tangible fixed assets. The lagged 
tangible fixed assets are used in order to eliminate the possibility of endogeneity 
4 The reader is referred to the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the accelerator model. 
5 The Orbis database enables the identification of firms that operate in wireline telecommunications 
markets with NACE code number 611010. For the resulting list of operators we verified which firms are 
registered on the Stock Exchange Markets based on the International Securities Identification Number 
(ISIN) which then enabled us to get the firm-level data from the Worldscope database. 
6 There is a big difference not only between the incumbents and entrants, but also within incumbents and 
entrants. For example the mean of CAPEX of the Austrian incumbent, A1 Telecom Austria, is €689 
million, while the mean of CAPEX of the Malta incumbent, GO PLC, is €18 million. On the other hand, the 
mean of CAPEX of the entrant German Freenet AG is €80 million, while the mean of CAPEX of the Polish 
entrant Telestrada SA is €47 thousand.  
[12] 
                                                            
between CAPEX and tangible fixed assets, since increasing CAPEX may increase 
tangible fixed assets of the current period. In addition, we use several other data 
sources for our control variables: the World Bank (The World Development Indicators) 
for data on GDP per capita and the International Telecommunications Union (World 
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database) for data on the number of personal 
computers in use per capita and fixed-to-mobile substitution. Finally, the European 
Central Bank and MarketLine provide data on the long term interest rate and population 
density, respectively. 
4.1. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎, represents firm level CAPEX divided by the lagged 
tangible fixed assets in the telecommunications industry in terms of property, plant and 
equipment. This contains, most notably, investment in backbone and access networks. 
Note that whereas most of the incumbents are active in both fixed and mobile 
broadband markets, the entrants included in our sample are mainly offering fixed 
broadband services only. 
4.2. Independent variables 
Based on our hypotheses we divide our explanatory variables into the following three 
groups: i) service-based competition ii) facility-based competition, and iii) control 
variables. The latter category contains variables related to our dynamic investment 
accelerator model as well as demand and cost controls. 
First, service-based competition, 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, is measured by dividing the number of 
regulated lines (including unbundling, bitstream and simple resale lines) by the sum of 
the regulated lines and incumbent’s retail lines, thus showing the share of incumbent’s 
lines made available through the regulated wholesale market. Hence, this variable 
captures the market effect of regulatory-induced service-based competition. The 
variable 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 incorporates both the wholesale and retail market, since incumbent’s retail 
lines represent the lines which the incumbent uses internally to deliver its services to the 
customers in the retail market.  
[13] 
Facility-based competition, 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, is directly related to wireline infrastructure 
investment of both the incumbent and entrants and measured in physical units. 
Therefore, we employ two different variables which enables the estimation of strategic 
effects regarding the incumbent’s and entrants’ investment decisions. First, facility-
based competition is obtained as the share of the entrants’ own lines related to the total 
number of retail broadband lines, 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡. Entrants’ own lines show the number of 
broadband lines that are directly connected to entrants’ self-deployed infrastructure by 
using other technologies than DSL (e.g. cable, fibre, WLL but excluding WiFi). Most 
notably, entrants’ own lines represent real investments of cable operators and 
municipalities. Second, wireline facility-based competition is measured by the variable, 
𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐, which is obtained as the share of the incumbent’s retail lines related to total 
number of retail broadband lines. Finally, the variable 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 measures intermodal 
wireless competition in terms of the extent of fixed-to-mobile competition by relating the 
total number of mobile lines to a country´s total number of fixed landlines. 
Regarding the group of control variables, we first refer to the variables related 
to our dynamic investment accelerator model. With respect to the desired level of capital 
stock (𝐾𝐾∗), there are different theories that assume that the desired level of capital stock 
is proportional to different indicators of business activity. According to the capacity 
utilization theory, the level of CAPEX is positively related to the capital to output ratio 
(Jorgenson & Siebert 1968). According to Eisner (1978), applying sales as a main 
observable (proxy) variable of output (𝑌𝑌), the capital stock is expected to change with 
changes in sales and, thus, CAPEX are taken as a distributed lag function of current 
and past sales. Accordingly, we include the sales to tangible fixed assets ratio, 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎, 
and the one period lagged sales to tangible fixed assets ratio. Moreover, we introduce 
an additional firm level variable, namely the cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio, 
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎. Fazzari et al. (1988) examine the effects of asymmetric information on access 
to external funds and thus on the firms’ investment level. The authors conclude that 
firms that are financially constrained are more sensitive to the availability of internal 
funds, such as cash flow. There is a large literature that investigates the relationship 
between investment and cash flow taking into account different factors that might 
explain this relationship, including creditworthiness, size and ownership structure (Bond 
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et al., 2003; Gugler, 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Vermeulen, 2002). So, different 
coefficient estimates for the variable 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 in the incumbents’ and entrants’ 
equations point to different levels of cash constraints. 
Finally, we employ additional country-level control variables to capture demand 
and cost side investment determinants: i) GDP per capita, 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, captures the income 
effects at the country level; ii) the number of personal computers in use per capita, 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, reflects the importance of the information technologies for the population 
(assuming that each computer has an internet connection) and also stands proxy for the 
overall broadband market size; iii) the long-term interest rate, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡_𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is expected to 
capture the cost of capital for long-term telecommunications investment; iv) population 
density, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎, shows different cost structures due to varying population densities 
across countries. 
All descriptive statistics as well as variable definitions, expected signs and 
sources are listed below in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. deviation Min Max 
  
Firm level (Incumbents) 
capex_as 198 0.1820 0.0676 0.0361 0.3244 
sales_as 198   1.3614     0.5036     0.4197    2.7091 
cflow_as 198     0.3919     0.1372    0.1165    0.7541 
  
Firm level (Entrants) 
capex_as 244 0.4136 1.6948 0.0007 26.3725 
sales_as 302 12.2836 17.2654 0.0730 105.4997 
cflow_as 300 0.5877 3.4281 -26.8139 10.0706 
  
Country level  
sbc 216     0.2566     0.1751     0.0002     0.6952 
fbc_inc 218        0.4931 0.1313           0 0.9438 
fbc_ent 215      0.3102     0.1837     0.0029     0.7613 
fms 230 4.6050 0.8296 0.8721 5.9 
gdp_pc 230     21787     11385 2349 43831 
comp_pc 230     0.4730     0.2744     0.0551    1.2329 
lt_ir 230        4.652     2.2211         0.57        22.5 
pop_dens 230     182.397     254.5591     17.1369     1280.74 
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Table 2: Variable descriptions and sources 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source 
 Dependent variable  
capex_as 
Firm capital expenditures divided by lagged tangible 
fixed assets (property, plant and equipment) – capital 
expenditures to tangible fixed assets ratio. Firm capital 
expenditures are measured in Euros. 
Worldscope 
 Main explanatory variables  
sbc  
(+/- incumbent; 
+/- entrant) 
Regulated lines (including unbundling, bitstream and 
simple resale lines) divided by the sum of regulated 
lines and incumbent’s retail lines. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
fbc_ent (+) 
The share of the entrants’ own lines related to total 
number of retail broadband lines. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
 
fbc_inc (+) 
The share of the incumbent’s retail lines related to total 
number of retail broadband lines. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
sales_as (+) 
Lag: sales_as (-) 
Firm sales divided by lagged tangible fixed assets 
(property, plant and equipment) - sales to tangible fixed 
assets ratio. Firm sales represent gross sales and 
other operating revenue less discounts, returns and 
allowances7. Firm sales are measured in Euros. 
Worldscope 
 Control variables  
cflow_as (+) 
Firm cash flow divided by lagged tangible fixed assets 
(property, plant and equipment) – cash flow to tangible 
fixed assets ratio. Firm cash flows are measured in 
Euros. 
Worldscope 
fms (+/-) Ratio of mobile lines to fixed landlines.  
World 
Telecommunication/ 
ICT Indicators Database 
gdp_pc (+) Gross domestic product per capita in Euro. 
The World Bank - The 
World Development 
Indicators 
comp_pc (+) 
The number of personal computers in use normalized 
to population. 
World 
Telecommunication/ 
ICT Indicators Database 
lt_ir (-) 
Harmonized long-term interest rates among the EU 
Member States. The rates were accessed as 
secondary market yields of government bonds with a 
remaining maturity of ten years. 
EU Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard 
pop_dens (+) 
A country’s population density in persons per square 
kilometre. MarketLine 
7 It excludes: non-operating income, interest income, interest capitalized, equity in earnings of 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, rental income, dividend income, foreign exchange adjustment, gain on debt 
retired, sale of land or natural resources, sale of plant and equipment, sale of investment, sales from 
discontinued operations, security transactions, general and service taxes, value-added taxes, etc. 
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5. Econometric modelling 
First, we describe our empirical baseline specification in section 5.1 and then our 
estimation and identification strategy in section 5.2.  
5.1. Econometric specification 
Our baseline specification refers to a dynamic reduced-form model in which investment 
expressed in monetary terms is specified for the operator i in EU member state j and 
year t as follows: 
(9) 
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where 𝛽𝛽0 = 𝜆𝜆, 𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜆𝜆) and 𝛽𝛽2 = −𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜆𝜆) according to the dynamic 
accelerator model (equation (8)). 𝛽𝛽0 represents the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable. 𝛽𝛽1 measures the investment-output sensitivity which depends on the 
adjustment process. Note that the difference between 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 is that 𝛽𝛽2 also captures 
the rate of replacement investment. 
Our baseline specification includes the regulatory-induced service-based 
competition variable, 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1, and the facility-based competition variable, 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 as the 
main competition variables of interest. The latter variable measures the 
contemporaneous stock of infrastructure of the incumbents (𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡) and the entrants 
(𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡). In order to identify firm-level causal effects and strategic interactions, we 
estimate equation (9) separately for incumbents and entrants. The variables 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 
and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 2 capture a potential non-linear influence from intermodal wireless 
competition. Based on our dynamic investment accelerator model, we include 
𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and   𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  as well as the lagged dependent variable  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. In 
addition, we include  𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 to control for firm-specific financial constraints, while the 
country level variables 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡_𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 represent our 
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demand and cost controls. Finally, 𝛾𝛾 represents the intercept, 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 firm-specific fixed 
effects, 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 time-specific effects, and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the error term. 
5.2. Estimation and identification strategy 
In estimating the baseline specification in equation (9), we are confronted with several 
sources of endogeneity: first, there might be potential endogeneity in terms of reverse 
causality underlying our regulation and competition variables, which are partly driven by 
the level of investment. However, the causal link between an increase of the level of 
investment and the number of (regulated) broadband lines within a period of time will be 
mitigated, since switching the broadband operator is subject to inertia due to long-term 
contracts with consumers (typically up to two years). Notwithstanding this, we include 
the lagged value of the variable 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 which further mitigates potential endogeneity in 
case there is no serial correlation in the original error term. However, we also have to 
take into account endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity and the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable as a right-hand side variable (Nickell, 1981). 
Dynamic GMM panel data estimation techniques represent the most prominent 
candidate estimator that allows us to simultaneously consider all the aforementioned 
sources of endogeneity underlying our main explanatory variables related to competition 
in broadband markets as well as sales and cash flow at the firm level. Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show by Monte Carlo analysis that their 
general method of moments system estimator (GMM-SYS) has a smaller bias than the 
general method of moments difference estimator (GMM-DIFF) initially developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) for finite samples. In addition, Bruno (2005a, 2005b) 
developed a bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) for unbalanced and dynamic 
panel data, which however requires that all other right-hand side variables are strictly 
exogenous. Although it is reasonable to consider dynamic autoregressive models such 
as in equation (9) as dynamically complete (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 299-300), the 
underlying assumption is still restrictive and therefore we consider LSDVC estimations 
to test the robustness of our GMM-SYS estimation results.  
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6. Discussion of the main results 
Table 3 and Table 4 below show the main estimation results based on the specification 
in equation (9) for the incumbents and entrants. All standard errors reported are robust 
to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the  𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡’s for GMM and 
bootstrapped for LSDVC models.8 The key identifying assumption underlying the GMM 
estimator is that the error terms in the original specification, 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡’s, are serially 
uncorrelated. For all GMM models reported in Table 3 and Table 4 the Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) and AR(3) tests for zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors do not reject 
at order two and three at conventional levels, respectively. This implies, most 
importantly, that there is no evidence for serial correlation in the original error. Also, the 
Hansen-Sargan tests do not reject the over-identifying restrictions at the conventional 
levels in all GMM models. All explanatory variables, except cost and demand controls, 
are specified as endogenous in all GMM specifications. In order to avoid an over fitting 
bias in case of too many instruments employed in GMM models, we restrict the 
maximum number of lagged instruments to keep the total number of instruments close 
to the number of groups. Finally, Table 3 and Table 4 show regression results for 
alternative estimators (GMM-SYS vs. LSDVC) and for alternative selections of control 
variables. All the main variables of interest appear to be robust with respect to these 
alternative model specifications.9,10 
First, as regards the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable,  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, 
Table 3 and Table 4 show highly significant and substantial estimates in all regressions 
indicating that the dynamic baseline specification is adequate. As expected, the 
coefficient is between 0 and 1. The GMM coefficient estimates for the incumbent 
equation lie in the interval of [0.434; 0.456] which is above the range of the 
corresponding GMM estimates for the entrant equation [0.329; 0.389]. This indicates 
that there are adjustment costs underlying NGA deployment which are apparently more 
8 Stata 13.1 is used to estimate the regressions. 
9 This also applies when we further reduce the number of instruments by using the “collapse” option of 
STATA´s “xtabond2” command (results are available upon request from the authors). 
10 Due to the variation in the entrants’ firm size we also checked for potential outliers by excluding 1% of 
the largest observations. Estimation results remain robust and are available upon request from the 
authors. 
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pronounced for the incumbents. A possible explanation for this is that investment data 
for the incumbent also contain investment in mobile network infrastructure, which 
involves comparatively high investment requirements and complex technical network 
planning as well as institutional rigidities due to limited spectrum licences. Another 
explanation would be that incumbents are simply larger and more diversified (active in 
all lines of businesses in the telecommunications sector), giving rise to smoother 
investment profiles than for entrants. 
Second, the coefficient of the variable 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is significantly positive, whereas 
the coefficient estimate of the lagged sales variable, 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, is significantly 
negative in all model specifications in Table 3 and Table 4. In conjunction with the 
coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, this represents 
strong supportive evidence for our dynamic flexible investment accelerator model as 
outlined in section 3.4. Additionally, we can distinguish between short- and long-run 
effects.11 An increase in 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 by 10%, increases the incumbents’ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 by up 
to 2.6% in the short-run and by 4.6% in the long-run. An increase in 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 by 10% 
increases the entrants’ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎by up to 0.1% in the short-run and by 0.14% in the long-
run. The low level of the coefficient estimate of the variables 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 
𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 for the entrants is mainly attributed to their low capital to output ratio 
(𝛼𝛼~0.008). The cash flow variable, 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, shows positive and significant coefficient 
estimates for the entrants' equation in both GMM and LSDVC regressions. This 
indicates that entrants might face difficulties to borrow money externally on the financial 
markets due to their smaller average size, ownership structure or creditworthiness. The 
positive and significant coefficient estimate shows that imperfect capital markets lead 
entrants to increase their investment level when internal funds get higher. An increase 
in 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 by 10% increases the entrants’ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 by up to 0.23% in the short-run 
and by 0.35% in the long-run. 
Third, as regards facility-based competition in terms of the contemporaneous 
infrastructure stock, 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡, the corresponding variables of the incumbent and entrant 
11 Short-run coefficient (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2) for 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎, analogous for the other coefficients and variables; long-run 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽1+𝛽𝛽21−𝛽𝛽0  for 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎, analogous for the other coefficients and variables. 
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operators (𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡) exhibit significant and positive coefficient estimates 
throughout all regressions. This suggests that firms’ investment decisions are strategic 
complements and investment decisions reinforce each other as hypothesized in section 
3.3. This effect is more pronounced with respect to the entrants´ equation. Hence, if 
regulatory policies – broadly understood encompassing any sector-specific regulations 
– exert a strong direct impact on investment of the incumbent operators, there is also a 
substantial indirect impact on the investment activities of entrants. An increase in 
𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 by 10 percentage points would lead to an increase in incumbents’ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 
by up to 1.8 percentage points in the short-run and by 3.1 percentage points in the long-
run. On the other hand, an increase in 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐_𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 by 10 percentage points would lead to 
an increase in entrants’ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 by up to 2.4 points in the short-run and by 3.7 
percentage points in the long-run. 
Fourth, facility-based intermodal competition in terms of fixed-mobile substitution 
is captured by the variables 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−12 . Whereas the coefficient estimates of 
the incumbent regressions exhibit a clear non-linear pattern in terms of an inverted U-
shape relation, the respective coefficient estimates are insignificant for the entrants´ 
regressions. It thus appears that incumbent are more affected by intermodal competition 
than entrants. If we consider the results for the incumbent´s specification in regressions 
(1) to (3) in Table 3, we find that a fixed-mobile ratio of around 4.3 is optimal for 
broadband investment of incumbents. According to Table 1 the mean value of the 
variable 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 is around 4.6 and hence above the optimum value of 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 that 
represents the maximum of the inverted U-shape relationship. As a consequence, 
intermodal competition from mobile networks exerted a positive impact on investment 
incentives of incumbent operators on average. 
Finally, the market effect of service-based competition as measured by the 
variable 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1, which hinges on relevant wholesale broadband access regulations, 
appears to have no significant impact on the investment decisions of incumbents and 
entrants on average, i.e. during the overall period of analysis. Whereas regression (3) in 
Table 4 reports a negatively significant coefficient estimates for the entrant´s equation, 
all other coefficient estimates are insignificant. The latter might be the outcome of the 
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opposing effects as identified in section 3.1. However, the impact of service-based 
competition might also depend on the different phases of market liberalization. Most 
notably, it can be assumed that service-based competition promoted competition and 
investment in the early phase of liberalization when infrastructure-based competition 
has been hardly established. In turn, with increasing levels of infrastructure-based 
competition, the investment promoting role of service-based competition might have 
decreased. Moreover, entrants who enjoy favourable access conditions in terms of a 
broadly established wholesale access regime with low risks will not self-deploy high-
cost intense access infrastructure. 
Table 5 reports GMM regression estimates for incumbents (regressions (1)-(2)) 
and entrants (regressions (3)-(4)) where we additionally included an interaction term, 
𝑖𝑖_𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1_𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑03_07, which captures the differential impact of service-based 
competition in the first phase of liberalization, i.e. for the years from 2003 to 2007.12 The 
dummy variable takes on the value 1 for the years from 2003 to 2007, and the value 0 
else. Indeed, we now find a neutral effect of service-based competition as regards 
entrants’ investment in the early phase and a significantly negative impact for the late 
phase of liberalization, i.e. for the years from 2008 to 2012. The impact of service-based 
competition remains insignificant for the entire period of analysis for incumbents. Note 
also that all other coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 remain robust in view of the 
before-mentioned results.  
12 In defining the interaction term we equally split our period of observation. Estimation results, however, 
are robust towards different specifications of liberalization phases (results are available from the authors 
upon request).  
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Table 3: Regression results for incumbents’ equation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: capex_asi,t GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS LSDVC 
capex_asi,t-1 0.434** 0.439* 0.456** 0.479*** 
 
(0.029) (0.054) (0.028) (0.000) 
sbcj,t-1 0.147 0.124 0.068 -0.003 
 
(0.350) (0.115) (0.292) (0.946) 
fbc_entj,t 0.183** 0.175* 0.143* 0.112* 
 
(0.020) (0.063) (0.078) (0.069) 
sales_asi,t 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.148*** 0.126*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
sales_asi,t-1 -0.079* -0.080* -0.069* -0.057** 
 
(0.083) (0.084) (0.094) (0.024) 
cflow_asi,t -0.080 -0.079 -0.039 0.097* 
 
(0.526) (0.550) (0.661) (0.077) 
fmsj,t-1 0.156** 0.154** 0.157** 0.022 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.753) 
fms2j,t-1 -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.002 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.023) (0.757) 
gdp_pcj,t -1.53e-10 1.49e-10 
 
3.93e-12 
 
(0.420) (0.415) 
 
(0.980) 
lt_irj,t -0.001 -0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
(0.840) (0.879) 
 
(0.869) 
pop_densj,t -2.28e-06 
  
0.000 
 
(0.942) 
  
(0.532) 
comp_pcj,t -1.80e-07 
  
1.96e-08 
 
(0.881) 
  
(0.981) 
Constant -0.418** -0.407** -0.377** 
 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) 
      AR(1) test p-value 0.066 0.070 0.055 
 AR(2) test p-value 0.550 0.537 0.541 
 Hansen-Sargan-test p-value 0.940 0.972 0.798 
 R-sq.: within    0.524 
#Instruments 30 30 30 
 #Observations 170 170 170 170 
Regressions (1)-(3) employ the two-step GMM system estimator. Regression (1) represents the full 
specification, while in regressions (2) and (3) we gradually reduce the number of control variables. In 
regression (4) we estimate the full specification using the LSDVC estimator. Since year dummies were 
jointly insignificant, we did not include them. Regressions (1)-(4) include firm fixed effects which we do 
not report for the sake of brevity. p-values for the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and the Hansen-Sargan test of 
over identifying restrictions are reported. p-values for estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses 
and are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. In regressions (1)-(3) the lagged dependent 
variable, capex_ast-1, and the main explanatory variables, fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, cflow_asi,t and sbcj,t-1 are 
instrumented by a maximum number of t - 4 lags. LSDVC standard errors are bootstrapped based on 
100 iterations with bias correction for estimates up to order O(1/T). * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Regression results for entrants’ equation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: capex_asi,t GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS LSDVC 
capex_asi,t-1 0.344*** 0.329*** 0.389*** 0.534*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sbcj,t-1 -0.103 -0.093 -0.152** 0.028 
 
(0.383) (0.187) (0.015) (0.842) 
fbc_incj,t 0.242*** 0.230*** 0.146** 0.261** 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.031) (0.028) 
sales_asi,t 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.004*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.000) 
sales_asi,t-1 -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005*** 
 
(0.032) (0.029) (0.012) (0.000) 
cflow_asi,t 0.023* 0.024** 0.024** 0.035*** 
 
(0.059) (0.049) (0.043) (0.000) 
fmsj,t-1 -0.039 -0.600 -0.052 0.321 
 (0.790) (0.558) (0.649) (0.139) 
fms2j,t-1 0.008 0.010 0.009 -0.035 
 (0.584) (0.413) (0.472) (0.132) 
gdp_pcj,t 6.34e-09 3.80e-09 
 
-8.25e-09 
 
(0.549) (0.577) 
 
(0.935) 
lt_irj,t 0.008 0.004 
 
-0.002 
 
(0.273) (0.460) 
 
(0.847) 
pop_densj,t 0.000 
  
-0.007 
 
(0.965) 
  
(0.186) 
comp_pcj,t 2.34e-07 
  
-6.90e-08 
 
(0.876) 
  
(0.979) 
Constant -0.023 0.058 0.143 
 
 
(0.955) (0.761) (0.542) 
 AR(1) test p-value 0.417 0.368 0.250 
 AR(2) test p-value 0.072 0.054 0.043 
 AR(3) test p-value 0.949 0.893 0.801 
Hansen-Sargan test p-value 0.935 0.940 0.833 
 R-sq.: within    0.584 
#Instruments 48 48 48 
 #Observations 177 177 177 177 
Regressions (1)-(3) employ the two-step GMM system estimator. Regression (1) represents the full 
specification, while in regressions (2) and (3) we gradually reduce the number of control variables. In 
regression (4) we estimate the full specification using the LSDVC estimator. Since year dummies were 
jointly insignificant, we did not include them. Regressions (1)-(4) include firm fixed effects which we do 
not report for the sake of brevity. p-values for the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and the Hansen-Sargan test of 
over identifying restrictions are reported. p-values for estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses 
and are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. In regressions (1)-(3) the lagged dependent 
variable, capex_ast-1, and the main explanatory variables fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, cflow_asi,t and sbci,t-1 are 
instrumented by a maximum number of t - 5 lags, starting from t - 3 due to a significant value of the 
AR(2) test, therefore we also report the AR(3) test p-value for regressions (1)-(3). LSDVC standard 
errors are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias correction for estimates up to order O(1/T).  
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Regression results for different phases of liberalization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Incumbent Entrants 
capex_asi,t GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS GMM SYS 
capex_asi,t-1 0.448** 0.469** 0.407*** 0.394*** 
 
(0.045) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) 
sbcj,t-1 0.164 0.061 -0.179* -0.160* 
 (0.324) (0.331) (0.077) (0.058) 
i_sbcj,t-1_dummy03_07 -0.018 -0.029 0.199*** 0.161*** 
 
(0.673) (0.465) (0.002) (0.000) 
fbc_entj,t 0.173** 0.124*   
 
(0.026) (0.087)   
fbc_incj,t   0.180** 0.165* 
   (0.026) (0.072) 
sales_asi,t 0.188*** 0.165*** 0.005** 0.005** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.018) 
sales_asi,t-1 -0.085 -0.081* -0.006** -0.006*** 
 
(0.106) (0.087) (0.011) (0.008) 
cflow_asi,t -0.104 -0.072 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.435) (0.431) (0.001) (0.003) 
fmsj,t-1 0.160* 0.153* -0.161 0.000 
 (0.058) (0.067) (0.180) (0.998) 
fms2j,t-1 -0.018* -0.017* 0.021* 0.002 
 (0.087) (0.092) (0.093) (0.891) 
gdp_pcj,t 1.38e-10  1.45e-09  
 
(0.416)  (0.320)  
lt_irj,t 0.001  0.006  
 
(0.773)  (0.355)  
pop_densj,t 0.000  -0.000  
 
(0.686)  (0.460)  
comp_pcj,t -3.95e-07  1.57e-06  
 
(0.741)  (0.282)  
Constant -0.426** -0.368* 0.336 0.030 
 
0.032 (0.054) 0.297 0.924 
AR(1) test p-value 0.081 0.053 0.134 0.155 
AR(2) test p-value 0.532 0.463 0.035 0.037 
AR(3) test p-value   0.145 0.159 
Hansen-Sargan test p-value 0.994 0.988 0.992 0.990 
#Instruments 29 29 57 55 
#Observations 170 170 177 177 
Regressions (1)-(4) employ the two-step GMM system estimator. Regressions (1) and (3) represent the full 
specification, while in regressions (2) and (4) we reduce the number of control variables. Since year dummies 
were jointly insignificant, we did not include them. Regressions (1)-(4) include firm fixed effects which we do 
not report for the sake of brevity. p-values for the AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests and the Hansen-Sargan test 
of over identifying restrictions are reported. p-values for estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses 
and are robust to heteroscedasticity in GMM estimates. In regressions (1)-(4) the lagged dependent variable, 
capex_asi,t-1, and the main explanatory variables, fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, cflow_asi,t and sbcj,t-1 are instrumented 
by maximum number of t - 4 lags. In regressions (3) - (4) the lagged dependent variable, capex_ast-1, and the 
main explanatory variables, fbc_entj,t, sales_asi,t, cflow_asi,t and sbcj,t-1 are instrumented by maximum number 
of t - 5 lags, starting from t - 3 due to a significant value of the AR(2) test, therefore we also report the AR(3) 
test p-value for regressions (3)-(4). * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
This paper intends to assess the impact of the main modes of competition on 
investment in broadband markets utilizing firm level data for European incumbent and 
entrant operators in the decade from 2003 to 2012. The period of analysis thus 
represents the phase of first-generation broadband competition and regulation. The 
econometric specification controls for various sources of endogeneity and 
accommodates separate firm-level investment specifications for (regulated) incumbent 
and (unregulated) entrant operators. The latter allows to test whether investment 
decisions are strategic complements or substitutes. Finally, investment dynamics are 
explicitly modelled in terms of a flexible accelerator model. 
We first find that firm-level investment activities are subject to adjustment costs 
which are more pronounced for the incumbent operators. Second, we find that 
intermodal competition in terms of fixed-mobile substitution exerted a non-linear impact 
on incumbents´ investment in terms of an inverted U-shape. This is partly in line with 
previous studies (e.g. Briglauer et al., 2013) but indicates that the overall impact on 
aggregate investment depends on the operator type. In turn, wireless competition had 
no significant impact on entrant´s investment during the period of analysis. Third, 
wireline facility-based competition exerted a positive and substantial impact on 
investment for both types of operators and clearly outperforms service-based 
competition which had no significant impact for the average incumbent and entrant 
operator during the overall period of analysis. The role of facility-based competition 
appears to be even stronger as regards migration towards new fiber-based 
infrastructure which constitutes more symmetric market structures with new and 
additional market players (Bourreau et al., 2010, p. 693). Fourth, NRAs have to consider 
that investment related policy decisions will exert a direct and indirect impact since 
firms’ investment decisions are strategic complements which reinforce the impact of an 
erroneous decision. NRAs claiming that service-based competition based on mandatory 
broadband access regulations remain necessary in the future shall thus bear the burden 
of proving convincingly that asymmetric market interventionism can be expected to be 
welfare enhancing. 
[26] 
Finally, as regards the late phase of market liberalization, service-based 
competition exerted a significantly negative impact on entrants´ investment activities. 
Hence, data from a decade of broadband access regulation are at odds with one of the 
main guiding regulatory principles of the EU regulatory framework according to which 
service-based competition also promotes investment in terms of infrastructure 
competition in the long-term. This also casts doubt on future regulatory access policies 
which continue to foresee multi-layer access obligations and service-based competition 
as a guiding principle for emerging fibre-based access networks (European 
Commission, 2010, recital 3). The higher the emphasis on dynamic efficiency is, the 
more the “regulatory frontier” is shifted towards softer regulation or symmetric regulation 
in terms of an industry coordinating role and enabling cooperation models (Vogelsang 
2013, p. 215).  
  
[27] 
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Appendix 
The dynamic flexible accelerator model  
By lagging equation (5) we obtain: 
211 1 −−− −−= tititi KKI ,,, )( δ          (A.11) 
Solving for 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 we obtain: 
δ−
−= −−− 1
11
2
titi
ti
IK
K ,,,           (A.12) 
By lagging equation (6) we obtain: 
211 1 −
∗
−− +−= tititi KKK ,,, )( λλ          (A.13) 
Next we insert equation (1) in equation (7) and obtain: 
1111 −− +−−−= titititi KKYI ,,,, )()( λδλα        (A.14) 
In the equation (A.14) we insert equation (A.13) and obtain: 
[ ] [ ]2121 1111 −∗ −−∗ − +−++−−−−= titititititi KKKKYI ,,,,,, )()()()( λλλλλδλα   (A.15) 
Next we reformulate equation (A.15) and obtain: 
2
2
121 11111 −
∗
−−
∗
− +−+−−−−−−= titititititi KKKKYI ,,,,,, )()())(()( λλλδλλδλα   (A.16) 
Now we combine equation (1) and (A.16) and insert the resulting expression in equation 
(A.12) and obtain: 
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Next we reformulate equation (A.17) and obtain: 
2
2
1111 1111 −
∗
−−−− +−+−+−−−−= tititititititi KKKIYYI ,,,,,,, )())(()( λλλλλλδαλα   (A.18) 
Again we insert equation (A.13) in the equation (A.18) and obtain: 
( )[ ] 2,21,2,1,1,1,,, )1(1)1)(1()1( −∗ −−∗ −−− +−++−−+−−−−= titititititititi KKKKIYYI λλλλλλλλδαλα  (A.19) 
Next we reformulate equation (A.19) and obtain: 
2
2
12
2
111 11111 −
∗
−−
∗
−−− +−+−−−+−−−−= titititititititi KKKKIYYI ,,,,,,,, )()())(()( λλλλλλλλδαλα  (A.20) 
Finally, we reformulate equation (A.20) and obtain our dynamic flexible accelerator 
investment model: 
11 111 −− −−−−+= titititi YYII ,,,, ))(()( λδαλαλ       (A.21)  
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